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Abstract
Why do some leaders use praise as a means to motivate workers, while other
leaders use social punishment? This paper develops a simple economic model to
examine how leadership styles depend on the prevailing labor-market conditions
for workers. We show that the existence of a binding wage floor for workers (e.g.,
due to trade union wage bargaining, minimum-wage legislation, or limited-liability
protection) can make it attractive for firms to hire a leader who makes use of social
punishment. While the use of social punishments generally is socially inefficient, it
lessens the need for high bonus pay, which allows the firm to extract rents from the
worker. In contrast, firms hire leaders who provide praise to workers only if it is
socially efficient to do so. Credible use of leadership styles requires either repeated
interaction or a leader with the right social preferences. In a single-period setting,
only moderately altruistic leaders use praise as a motivation tool, whereas only
moderately spiteful leaders use social punishment. Lastly, we show that when the
leaders’ and workers’ reservation utilities give rise to a bigger income gap between
leaders and workers, attracting spiteful leaders becomes relatively less costly and
unfriendly leadership becomes more prevalent.
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market conditions, wage-setting.
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1 Introduction
Leaders differ widely in the styles they adopt to motivate their workers. Some leaders use
styles that, simultaneously, motivate workers as well as increase workers’ job satisfaction.
Think for instance of leaders who provide praise from time to time in a thoughtful
manner. This likely makes workers feel better motivated and more satisfied with their
job at the same time (see, e.g., Artz et al. 2020). However, evidence abounds that not
all leaders act in this “friendly” way. Some leaders try to keep workers motivated by
harassing poor performers, hoping that this will impress the workforce at large and keep
them from slacking. Clearly, the use of such “unfriendly” leadership styles will decrease
rather than increase workers’ well-being on the job.1
This paper is concerned with the question of how firms choose their leaders and
consequently leadership styles and, in particular, how this choice is affected by the
labor-market conditions workers face. We compare firms that employ workers hired in a
competitive labor market with firms that face a binding wage floor when hiring workers.
Such a wage floor may arise for a variety of reasons including trade union wage bargain-
ing, minimum-wage legislation, downward wage rigidity, and limited-liability protection.
We find that the presence of a wage floor has major consequences for the use of lead-
ership styles that involve unfriendly leadership actions. While such actions are never
used when workers are hired in a competitive labor market, they are sometimes used
in the presence of a wage floor, and the more so the worse the workers’ labor market
prospects are. The intuition is that in competitive labor markets, firms need to com-
pensate workers for all of the costs imposed on them, including the harm from exposure
to unfriendly leadership actions. When firms can also motivate workers using incentive
pay, they will never motivate by unfriendly leadership actions, because it is always more
costly to attain higher effort in the latter way than by increasing incentive pay. In con-
trast, when firms face a binding wage floor for their workers, they sometimes do adopt
unfriendly leadership actions. The reason is that in such labor markets, workers earn a
rent when staying with their current employer, and hence need not be compensated for
the harm imposed on them. This can make unfriendly leadership actions an attractive
alternative to incentive pay. The use of friendly leadership actions as a motivation tool
is less responsive to the prevailing labor-market conditions for workers, because such
1For example, the New York Times reports that Jeff Bezos has installed a “bruising” and “sometimes-
punishing” workplace culture at Amazon and quotes a former employee saying that “Nearly every person
I worked with, I saw cry at their desk” (Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). Similarly, Volkswagen’s culture
under former CEO Martin Winterkorn is said to have been characterized by “fear and respect.” A
former executive claimed that “If you presented bad news, those were the moments that it could become
quite unpleasant and loud and quite demeaning” (Cremer and Bergin 2015). There is also widespread
anecdotal evidence for an “angry-chef culture” in the restaurant industry (Lott-Lavigna 2018). Tepper
et al. (2017) estimate that 10% of all employees suffer from abusive supervision, i.e., what Tepper (2000,
p. 178) defines as “subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained
display of hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors, excluding physical contact.”
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actions allow the firm to reduce incentive pay both in the presence and in the absence
of a binding wage floor.2
In addition to this positive analysis yielding the predictions just described, we also
perform a welfare analysis. We find that motivating through friendly leadership actions
only occurs if it is efficient from a social welfare perspective. Using unfriendly leadership
actions to motivate workers, on the other hand, is never socially efficient, and yet the
firm sometimes adopts it when wage-setting is non-competitive. The reason for firms to
adopt an inefficient leadership style is that it allows them to extract part of the rents
that would otherwise end up in the hands of the workers.
Lastly, we study the credible use of leadership styles, which the firm has to ensure
because the leader incurs costs from engaging in non-contractible leadership actions. We
explore two ways in which a firm’s announcement of a leadership style may be credible:
repeated interaction and hiring a leader with the “right” social preferences. Repeated
interaction makes the adoption of leadership styles self-enforcing provided that the leader
cares sufficiently about the future. Interestingly, while the self-enforcing condition for
a motivational friendly leadership style is independent of labor-market conditions, the
condition for a motivational unfriendly leadership style is not. The worse the worker’s
labor market prospects, the larger the range of discount factors for which unfriendly
leadership actions are self-enforcing.
If leaders do not care sufficiently about the future, credible implementation of lead-
ership styles can be accomplished by hiring a leader with the “right” social preferences.
Principals can choose between leaders with different social preferences, ranging from
spiteful to altruistic.3 We show that for praise to be a credible means to motivate the
worker, a moderately altruistic leader is required. The intuition is that a leader who
is too altruistic would always provide praise, independent of the worker’s performance.
On the other hand, a leader who is not sufficiently altruistic would not live up to the
promise of providing praise after good work performance. For social punishment to be
a credible motivational device, a moderately spiteful leader is needed. A too spiteful
leader would always punish, while a leader who is not spiteful enough would never pun-
ish. Interestingly, a selfish leader cannot commit to using any leadership style, at least
not in a one-shot game. In addition to making a leadership style credible, leaders’ social
preferences have further consequences for the costs of leadership. Among others, we
show that worse labor market prospects of the worker relative to the leader make it
more costly to employ an altruistic leader and less costly to employ a spiteful leader,
2Relatedly, Clemens et al. (2018) have argued that a binding minimum wage may reduce fringe
benefits provided by employers. We do not find such an effect for the friendly leadership style, because
friendly leadership is a substitute for incentive pay in our framework, something which is absent in the
model by Clemens et al. (2018).
3In modelling social preferences of leaders, we follow the same approach as in Rotemberg and Saloner
(1993)’s seminal leadership paper, except that we also allow for spite (i.e., negative altruism).
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rendering the use of unfriendly leadership styles more attractive for the firm.
The key insight of our paper is that firms may hire leaders that adopt unfriendly
leadership actions when workers earn rents from staying with their current employer.
Such rents can originate from trade union wage bargaining or minimum-wage legislation,
but may also stem from other labor market policies such as employment protection
legislation (EPL). Interestingly, Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2016) offer evidence that
enhanced EPL can increase workers’ stress and hence reduce their well-being. While
this finding may seem paradoxical at first sight, it is well in line with the predictions of
our model. As Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2016) argue, EPL may reduce the rate of
job separations, resulting in firms opening fewer positions, which in turn entails longer
periods of unemployment. As a consequence, workers’ rents from staying with their
current employer increase. According to our model, leaders may then use unfriendly
leadership styles more often, which is likely to increase workers’ stress.4
Our model can also be applied to jobs that involve tasks with a high cost of fail-
ure. Employees in such jobs are typically protected by limited liability. Examples
include C-level executives, doctors, or soldiers. Our model can accommodate such jobs
by imposing a negative wage floor. According to Tepper (2007), leadership research on
abusive supervision indicates that industries such as the military and health care, which
are characterized by high work demands, risk, and high costs associated with failure
are particularly susceptible to abusive leader behaviors. Our model suggests that this
may be due to binding limited-liability constraints that prevent the implementation of
effective monetary incentive schemes.
While leadership styles have received little attention in organizational economics
(see the next section for a discussion of the literature), there exists a related literature
on child labor and child soldiering, studying the role of violence and manipulation in
resolving moral-hazard problems (Chwe 1990, Gates 2002, Beber and Blattman 2013).
The theoretical study by Chwe (1990) is closest to ours. It shows that a principal may
want to use “pain” in a principal-agent relationship when the agent is wealth constrained
and the reservation utility of the agent is sufficiently bad.5 Beber and Blattman (2013)
add manipulation (in the form of intimidation, indoctrination, and misinformation) as
an additional instrument at the disposal of the principal. Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011)
4As alternative explanations for higher stress levels, Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2016) suggest that
lower outside options exacerbate workers’ fear of layoffs or prevent workers from quitting jobs that they
dislike. In Appendix F of their paper they present a partial equilibrium model with a fixed outside option
for workers in order to describe two additional mechanisms that could increase stress under EPL: First,
as firing threats can no longer be used to motivate workers, employers may resort to increased monitoring
to ensure high effort. Second, to induce low-productivity workers to quit, employers may combine more
intensive monitoring with low-quality working conditions, which may also involve “unfriendly measures”
such as psychological pressure or harassment. In contrast to our model, such measures are not used as
an incentive device but as a selection device.
5Sherstyuk (2000) shows that a principal may want to use a costlessly available punishment threat
associated with not meeting a standard if limited liability restricts the use of monetary fines.
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extend Chwe (1990)’s paper by allowing the principal to affect the agent’s outside option,
giving rise to endogenous labor coercion. We differ from this literature in our focus on
modern employment relationships and labor market institutions. Moreover, we take self-
commitment issues of the firm into account and study repeated interaction and leaders’
social preferences as potential solutions.
For managers and firm owners, our paper offers several insights that may prove use-
ful in practice. First, our paper offers a framework to systematically think about the
economic benefits and costs of implementing different leadership styles. Workers’ and
leaders’ preferences play an important role here. But, as our key argument stresses,
labor-market conditions faced by workers can also have a decisive impact on the desir-
ability of some leadership styles for the organization. For instance, when workers are
hired in a competitive labor market, organizations should avoid hiring leaders who em-
ploy unfriendly styles. In practice, managers and firm owners may not always be aware
of this, resulting in unnecessarily high worker turnover in parts of their organizations.
This may particularly occur when the structure of wages in the organization is such that
it is a relatively attractive place to work for leaders who are inclined to use unfriendly
styles — styles that may well be harmful for the organization’s overall performance.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes our model. In Section 4, we first analyze the firm’s problem of
choosing an optimal leadership style when only a selfish leader is available. We allow for
social preferences of the leader in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to Online Appendix A. In Online Appendix B and C, we discuss two variants
of our model.
2 Related literature
Our paper contributes to a small, but growing literature that uses formal modelling
to analyze leadership. Indeed, economists have extensively analyzed how leaders (or
principals) can induce workers (or agents) to exert the right level or type of effort, but
the dominant approach is contractual: Incentive problems are solved by contracts and/or
organizational design. The leadership literature, on the other hand, has focused much
less on contracts, but concentrates on how leaders can (in economic terms) influence the
beliefs and/or preferences of the workers (Zehnder et al. 2017). This literature typically
evolves around the concepts of transformational and transactional leadership. While
transactional leaders use performance-contingent actions to motivate their followers,
transformational leaders inspire, persuade, and motivate their workers by articulating
meaning, visions, and goals (see Bass 1990, House and Aditya 1997, and Robbins and
Judge 2013).
4
In our model, the leader can take performance-contingent actions that praise good or
punish bad performance. Depending on whether these actions have positive or negative
effects on the worker’s well-being, we label the leader’s style as “friendly” or “unfriendly”.
We thus study a firm’s optimal choice between transactional leadership styles, that
fundamentally differ in their consequences for workers’ well-being.
This contrasts to the most common approach in the small economics leadership
literature, that models aspects of transformational leadership. Dur et al. (2010) and
Kvaløy and Schöttner (2015) consider models in which a manager’s ex ante motivational
actions reduce the effort costs of the worker. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993, 1994, 2000)
examine in a series of papers how vision and leadership style can affect incentive contracts
and workers’ motivation. Van den Steen (2005) analyzes how managers with strong
beliefs about the right course of action can attract workers with similar beliefs, while
Hermalin (2017) studies how charismatic leaders with superior information can make
emotional appeals that induce both “emotional” workers and rational workers to work
harder.6 Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005), Dur (2009), and Non (2012) study how the
leader can take actions that transform the worker’s identity or his altruism towards the
leader.
In contrast to all these papers, we consider performance-contingent leadership ac-
tions. We thus extend the economic leadership literature by formulating a model that
includes transactional leadership styles that go beyond the use of purely financial in-
centives. In this respect, our paper is more in line with Besley and Ghatak (2008) who
study a model where the principal can costlessly give a positional good in addition to a
monetary bonus to well-performing agents.
Importantly, we also consider leadership actions that may be harmful for the worker.
Moreover, a distinguishing feature of our paper is that we investigate how the choice of
these different leadership instruments depends on the prevailing labor-market conditions
for workers. As such, our paper focuses on a key difference between motivating through
leadership and motivating through incentive contracts: Wage payments are frequently
subject to exogenous constraints imposed by labor-market regulation whereas firms are
relatively free to choose a leadership style. We study whether firms may alleviate the
consequences of wage constraints by adopting a leadership style that can exploit workers’
preferences for praise or social punishments.
Leadership scholars refer to styles that we label as “unfriendly” as destructive (Fer-
ris et al. 2007), abusive (Tepper 2000), incivil (Pearson et al. 2000), or toxic (Lipman-
Blumen 2005). The literature mainly treats these leadership styles as undesirable and
6Several other papers on the economics of leadership also emphasize the importance of information.
In Hermalin (1998, 2007), Komai et al. (2007), Komai and Stegeman (2010), Lazear (2012), and Bolton
et al. (2013) the leader has followers because of superior skills or superior information about the right
course of actions for the firm.
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inefficient. However, some papers also discuss how destructive leadership in some situ-
ations can promote organizational performance (Salin 2003 and Ferris et al. 2007), and
recent studies suggest that anger expression may help leader effectiveness (e.g., Wang
et al. 2018). This is also the case in our paper. Even if unfriendly leadership reduces
the workers’ well-being, it sometimes improves the organization’s performance. In this
sense, the form of unfriendly leadership we analyze is more associated with Theory X
leadership (McGregor 1960) and what is later termed directive leadership (see House
1971 and Pearce et al. 2003). This leadership style allows for threats, punishments, and
contingent reprimands in order to promote high performance (Pearce et al. 2003).
Our paper is also related to principal-agent models of intrinsic motivation and so-
cial preferences, such as Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), Besley and Ghatak (2005),
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008)—see Besley and Ghatak (2018) and Cassar and Meier
(2018) for recent surveys. Like these papers, we assume that workers obtain utility from
work (or performances), but in contrast to their models, the non-monetary utilities in
our model stem directly from costly leadership actions. However, we also allow the
leader/principal to have social preferences, such as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1993),
Prendergast and Topel (1996), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), and Dur and Tichem
(2015).
With respect to the (non-economics) leadership literature, our paper is related both
to the literature on leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness. The literature on
leadership emergence has mainly focused on the psychological traits of the individuals
who emerge as leaders (see, e.g., Judge et al. 2002). We contribute to this literature
by showing that economic and/or institutional conditions can determine the returns to
and, hence, emergence of different leader personalities.
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that task and job characteristics
are crucial for the effectiveness of different leadership styles (see Zehnder et al. 2017).
Our model can potentially account for this by letting leadership costs or non-monetary
utilities be a function of task or job characteristics. However, there is also evidence
that similar firms use very different management practises and leadership styles (House
et al. 2004, Bloom et al. 2012, Artz et al. 2020). In line with this, Liu et al. (2003)
argue—in a conceptual model—that employment modes and contracting relationships
may matter more for the choice of leadership style than task and job characteristics. Our
paper supports this conjecture by developing a novel argument using a formal model.
The same task or job could meet very different leadership styles. It is the wage-setting
regime, and thus the nature of the labor market, rather than the nature of the task that
determines optimal leadership style in our model.
Our model also challenges the prevailing (non-formal) theory on the relationship be-
tween leadership style and employee turnover. The standard hypothesis is that employees
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will want to quit their job if they are exposed to forms of unfriendly leadership, and hence
that unfriendly—or destructive—leadership increases turnover (see Hyson 2016 for a re-
cent overview). We show theoretically that this relationship is not so straightforward. It
is exactly when turnover rates are low—or more precisely, when the outside options are
bad and workers earn a rent—that one may see unfriendly leadership. Interestingly, the
empirical relationship between destructive leadership and employee turnover is not so
clear, indicating that the mechanism we describe in our model may balance the “wanting
to quit” motives.
3 The model
A firm owner (principal) needs to hire a leader to run the firm. The leader in turn
is required to hire a worker to perform a production task. The worker can choose
between two effort levels, high and low. The worker’s costs of high effort are c > 0,
while low effort does not entail any effort costs. Effort is non-observable. The worker’s
output is verifiable and can be high or low, where expected output increases with effort.
Specifically, when effort is low, output is always low.7 When effort is high, output is high
with probability ρ, where 0 < ρ < 1. We assume that the principal always wants the
worker to choose high effort, because the associated increase in expected output value
always exceeds the associated increase in the principal’s wage costs. Thus, our focus is
not on whether, but on how the worker will be motivated.
The worker can be motivated by monetary incentives and/or the leader’s leadership
actions. The monetary incentive consists of a bonus b paid to the worker when output
is high. In addition to a possible bonus, the worker earns a base salary w. The leader
can undertake leadership actions after observing the worker’s output. On the one hand,
the leader can take friendly leadership actions, e.g., praise the worker, which generates
a non-monetary reward r > 0 for the worker. On the other hand, a leader can also be
unfriendly, e.g., scold or engage in social punishment, which imposes a non-monetary
disutility s > 0 on the worker.
The leader incurs costs when she engages in leadership actions.8 We interpret these
costs as psychological costs from taking the action and/or opportunity costs of time.
The costs depend on the type of action undertaken and on the worker’s output. Praising
the worker is less costly for the leader when output is high than when it is low. For
instance, it is easier to provide authentic praise if the worker accomplished something
praiseworthy (producing high output). Likewise, scolding the worker is assumed less
costly for the leader when output is low than when output is high. Quite naturally, it is
7Introducing a strictly positive probability of a high output when effort is low would not qualitatively
change our results.
8In Online Appendix B, we discuss how our results are affected when we drop this assumption.
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F ) denotes the leader’s costs of praising the worker if output is low (high)
and khU (k
l
U ) denotes the leader’s costs of scolding the worker if output is high (low).
In practice, the provision of the type of non-monetary rewards or punishments that we
have in mind is typically not expressed in explicit contracts. Like the worker’s effort,
the leader’s actions are commonly non-verifiable. We thus make the assumption that
the leader’s actions cannot be contracted upon.
We define leadership styles based on the leadership actions undertaken by the leader
conditional on the worker’s output. The following leadership styles are available:9
• Conditional friendly leadership (Style F ): The leader praises if output is high but
does not take a leadership action if output is low.
• Unconditional friendly leadership (Style FF ): The leader always praises the worker
irrespective of the output.
• Conditional unfriendly leadership (Style U): The leader scolds the worker if output
is low but does not take a leadership action if output is high.
• Unconditional unfriendly leadership (Style UU): The leader always scolds the
worker irrespective of the output.
• Carrot-and-stick leadership (Style FU): The leader praises the worker if output is
high and scolds the worker if output is low.
As we will show later, whether the implementation of a leadership style is credible
or not may depend on the leader’s social preferences towards the worker. Following
Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), we assume that the leader’s utility is given by
(1− θ) · (leader’s net payoff) + θ · (worker’s net payoff),
where θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] denotes the leader’s type with 0 ≤ θ̄ ≤ 1/2 and θ ≤ 0. Type θ = 0
corresponds to a selfish leader, who only cares about her own payoff. If θ > 0 (θ < 0),
the leader is altruistic (spiteful) towards the worker.10
9Given the assumptions we make, these are all the leadership styles that might be optimally chosen.
Others (such as only scold when output is high and only praise when output is low) are dominated both
from the principal’s and the leader’s perspective.
10Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) restrict attention to θ ≥ 0 and call a leader with θ > 0 “empathetic.”
Andreoni and Miller (2002) provide empirical evidence using incentivized experiments showing that,
while a majority of people can be characterized as altruistic, a substantial minority is spiteful.
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The worker is risk neutral and his reservation utility is u ≥ 0. He has no social
preferences concerning the leader and hence maximizes his expected net payoff. The
worker’s earnings must always be at least equal to a wage floor denoted by w. The
wage floor is exogenous and originates from, e.g., trade-union bargaining, minimum-
wage legislation, or limited-liability protection. The absence of any exogenous wage
restriction can be represented by w = −∞ in our model. The relative size of u and w
will determine the labor-market conditions for the worker, i.e., whether wage-setting for
the worker is competitive or non-competitive. We provide the exact definitions regarding
the wage-setting environment in Section 4.1.
The leader is also risk neutral and has reservation utility ul.
11 She receives a fixed
wage wl.
12 We assume that the leader’s reservation utility ul is so high that the wage
floor is never binding for the leader. This assumption allows us to focus on how worker’s
labor-market conditions and rents affect leadership styles.
Because the principal is assumed to be always willing to induce high effort, the
principal’s objective is to minimize total expected wages paid to the leader and the
worker to induce high effort. We assume that engaging in non-monetary leadership
actions is never sufficient to induce high effort; i.e., the worker will always receive a
strictly positive bonus.13 As will become clear later on, this assumption amounts to
r + s < c/ρ.
The timeline is as follows.
1. Principal chooses a leader type θ.
2. Principal announces a leadership style and offers the leader a wage wl. The prin-
cipal further stipulates the contract (w, b) for the worker.
3. Leader accepts or rejects. If the leader rejects, the game ends and the parties
obtain their reservation utilities. If the leader accepts, the game proceeds.
4. Leader offers contract (w, b) to the worker. The worker observes the leader’s type.
11Note that the reservation utility is assumed to be independent of the leader’s type. This may reflect
a situation where the leader’s outside option is self-employment or unemployment (in the period under
consideration), which may give each type the same utility. Note also that this assumption implies that the
leader’s social preferences (altruism or spite) towards the worker only exist when the leader is employed
by the principal, not in the leader’s outside option.
12In addition to the fixed wage, the leader could obtain a bonus contingent on the worker’s output.
However, a bonus for the leader is redundant because the leader takes her actions after output has been
realized, so that a bonus does not affect the leader’s incentives to undertake leadership actions but only
her decision whether or not to work for the principal. The leader’s participation, however, can be ensured
by paying a fixed wage only.
13In Online Appendix C, we analyze a variant of our model where the worker cannot be incentivized
by a bonus because his output is non-verifiable, and worker rents arise because of exogenous firm-specific
characteristics.
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5. Worker accepts or rejects the contract. If the worker rejects, the game ends and the
parties obtain their reservation utilities. If the worker accepts, the game proceeds.
6. Worker chooses effort and output is realized.
7. Leader chooses leadership action.
8. Leader and worker are paid.
We first want to focus our analysis on the relative benefits of the leadership styles
under different labor-market conditions for the worker, while neglecting the impact of the
leader’s social preferences. Therefore, in Section 4, we restrict attention to a situation
where, at stage 1, the principal can only hire a selfish leader, i.e., θ = θ̄ = 0. In a one-
shot interaction, a selfish leader never wants to undertake leadership actions, because
imposing a (dis)utility on the worker is costly and does not yield any benefit to the leader.
In the first part of Section 4, we abstract from this commitment problem, assuming that
the leader will adopt the principal’s announced leadership style. In Section 4.6, we show
that the leader can credibly commit to profitable leadership styles in a multi-period
setting when the leader’s discount factor is sufficiently high and the leader has sufficient
wealth to buy the firm. In Section 5, we examine how the existence of social preferences
affects the self-enforcement properties of the different leadership styles as well as the
principal’s decisions which type of leader to hire and what style to implement.
4 Optimal leadership styles when the leader is selfish
In this section, we present the solution to our model for the case where the principal can
hire only a selfish leader, i.e., θ = θ̄ = 0. We first assume that, given that the leader
has accepted the principal’s contract offer, she will adopt the leadership style that the
principal has announced. As a benchmark, we first describe in Section 4.1 the situation
where the worker is motivated by monetary incentives only. In Sections 4.2, 4.3, and
4.4 we investigate whether or not, relative to the benchmark, the principal benefits from
complementing monetary incentives with a friendly, unfriendly, or the carrot-and-stick
leadership style, respectively. In Section 4.5, we determine the overall optimal leadership
style. Finally, in Section 4.6, we drop the assumption that the leader simply follows the
principal’s announced style and characterize the circumstances in which our previous
results continue to hold in a multi-period setting.
4.1 Benchmark: Pure monetary incentives
When the leader does not undertake any leadership actions, the setting corresponds to
a standard moral-hazard problem with binary outcome, binary effort, and a wage floor
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(e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002). The worker chooses high effort when his expected
utility from doing so is equal to or exceeds the expected utility attained when exerting
low effort; that is, if:
w + ρb− c ≥ w ⇔ b ≥ c/ρ.
In order to attract and retain the worker, the expected utility from accepting and keeping
the job must be equal to or exceed the worker’s reservation utility:
w + ρb− c ≥ u ⇔ w ≥ u− ρb+ c.
In addition, the worker’s base salary cannot be below the wage floor w:
w ≥ w.
Hence, the principal minimizes the worker’s expected wage by choosing the lowest bonus
that triggers high effort and the lowest base salary that satisfies the exogenous wage
constraint and ensures the participation of the worker:
b∗ = c/ρ and w∗ = max{u,w}.
If the wage floor w is sufficiently low so that the respective constraint is not binding,
i.e., w ≤ u, we speak of competitive wage-setting. This is the case in the absence of
exogenous wage restrictions (i.e., w = −∞), but also if wage restrictions have no bite
as the worker’s outside option is sufficiently attractive. By contrast, if w > u, the wage
constraint is binding and we refer to this situation as non-competitive wage-setting.14
The principal optimally sets the leader’s wage wl equal to the leader’s reservation
utility ul. Hence, under pure monetary incentives for the worker, the principal’s total
costs, which we denote by C0, are:
C0 = w
∗ + ρb∗ + ul = c+max{u,w}+ ul.
With competitive wage-setting, the principal exactly compensates the worker for his cost
of effort as well as for missing out on his outside opportunities. Under non-competitive
wage-setting, the principal’s costs increase by the rent he has to leave to the worker,
w − u.
14If we introduce a strictly positive probability of a high output when effort is low, α ∈ (0, 1), we
obtain w∗ = {u − α(c/ρ), w}. Hence, non-competitive wage-setting can also occur for negative wage
floors, which arise in jobs where a limited-liability constraint applies, as discussed in the Introduction.
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4.2 Friendly leadership
4.2.1 Leadership style F
Suppose the leader adopts the friendly leadership style F , which entails a non-monetary
reward r to the worker conditional on high output at cost khF to the leader. The worker
exerts high effort if:
w + ρ(b+ r)− c ≥ w ⇔ b ≥ (c/ρ)− r.
The worker accepts the job if:
w + ρ(b+ r)− c ≥ u.
In addition, the worker’s base salary needs to satisfy w ≥ w. It follows that the optimal
bonus and the optimal base salary amount to:




respectively. Accordingly, adoption of style F allows the principal to reduce the worker’s
bonus by r, whereas the worker’s base salary does not change relative to the benchmark
case of pure monetary incentives. The leader’s expected payment now equals ρkhF + ul
because the leader needs to be compensated for her expected costs of undertaking a







F + ul = c− ρ(r − k
h
F ) + max{u,w}+ ul.
Comparing CF and the principal’s costs in the benchmark case, C0, it follows that
the principal’s costs are reduced by adopting style F if:
khF < r, (F )
that is, when the worker’s utility gain from receiving praise exceeds the leader’s costs
of giving praise when output is high. The worker’s expected utility remains unaffected
by style F because the expected gain from praise equals the expected loss in bonus
compensation. Hence, style F is not employed to reduce the worker’s rent in the case of
non-competitive wage-setting.
We now ask the question whether the principal’s choice is socially optimal. The
adoption of a leadership style is socially optimal if it increases the total surplus generated
within the employment relationship. We thus need to compare the leader’s costs of
adopting style F with the ensued utility for the worker. We have seen that the leadership
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style also affects wages, but changes in wages leave the total surplus unaffected because
they merely constitute a transfer from the principal to the worker or the leader. The
friendly style F increases the worker’s expected utility by ρr, whereas the leader incurs
expected costs ρkF . It hence is socially optimal to adopt this style if r > k
h
F , which is
in accordance with condition (F ).
Lemma 1 summarizes the results for the friendly leadership style F .
Lemma 1 Independent of labor-market conditions characterized by u and w, the prin-
cipal prefers style F to pure monetary incentives if adopting the style is socially optimal,
i.e., the worker’s benefit exceeds the leader’s costs so that condition (F ) holds. The
worker’s rent remains unaffected under style F relative to a situation with pure mone-
tary incentives.
4.2.2 Leadership style FF
Instead of only being friendly and providing praise in case of high output, the leader
could always be friendly, i.e., adopt style FF . As unconditional leadership actions do
not provide the worker with effort incentives, the bonus eliciting high effort under style
FF is the same as under pure monetary incentives. However, relative to the benchmark,
the principal can reduce the base salary by r as long as doing so does not violate the
wage-floor constraint. Consequently, the optimal bonus and base salary now is:
bFF = b∗ = c/ρ and w∗FF = max {u− r, w} ,




∗ + ρkhF + (1− ρ)k
l
F + ul = c+max{u− r, w}+ ρk
h
F + (1− ρ)k
l
F + ul.
When we compare these costs with the costs under pure monetary incentives, C0, we
can immediately see that always being friendly is not worthwhile for the principal under
non-competitive wage-setting, i.e., if w > u. Because the principal cannot lower the
worker’s base salary in this case, always being friendly only leads to additional costs for
the leader. It is straightforward to verify that style FF is profitable under competitive
wage-setting, i.e., CFF < C0, if and only if:
ρkhF + (1− ρ)k
l
F < min {r, u− w} . (FF )
The left-hand side of this condition corresponds to the leader’s expected costs for which
the principal needs to compensate the leader, whereas the right-hand side describes the
decrease in the worker’s base salary. Due to wage-setting restrictions, adoption of style
FF can reduce the worker’s base salary by at most u − w, which hence constitutes an
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upper bound on the principal’s benefit from creating extra utility r for the worker. Thus,
the higher the worker’s outside option relative to the wage floor, the greater the region
among the other parameters for which leadership style FF dominates the benchmark.
Adoption of style FF strictly increases the worker’s utility if the worker’s gain from
the leader’s friendliness exceeds the decrease in the base salary, i.e., if u − r < w or,
equivalently, u−w < r. If r ≤ u−w, the worker is equally well off under pure monetary
incentives and style FF . Adoption of style FF is socially efficient when the worker’s
associated gain exceeds the leader’s expected costs, i.e., ρkhF + (1 − ρ)k
l
F < r. The
principal hence makes a socially inefficient decision when the latter condition is met but
the worker’s rent, u − w, is lower than the leader’s costs. Lemma 2 summarizes the
results for style FF .
Lemma 2 The principal prefers style FF to pure monetary incentives if and only if con-
dition (FF ) holds, which is possible only under competitive wage-setting. The worker’s
utility weakly increases when style FF is adopted relative to pure monetary incentives.
The principal refrains from adopting style FF even though adopting the style would be




4.3.1 Leadership style U
Under style U , the leader incurs a cost klU to impose a social penalty on the worker after
observing low output, implying a non-monetary cost of s for the worker. The worker
exerts high effort if:
w + ρb− (1− ρ)s− c ≥ w − s ⇔ b ≥ (c/ρ)− s.
The worker accepts the job if:
w + ρb− (1− ρ)s− c ≥ u.
In addition, the worker’s base salary cannot be below w. We obtain for the optimal
bonus and for the optimal base salary:
b∗U = (c/ρ)− s and w
∗
U = max{u+ s, w},
respectively. Accordingly, relative to the benchmark of pure monetary incentives, style
U allows the principal to lower the bonus by amount s. However, the principal might also
need to increase the base salary to compensate the worker for the expected cost of the
social penalty. This is always the case if style U is implemented under competitive wage-
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setting (i.e., w ≤ u). The base salary needed to attract the worker must then increase
by amount s. This exactly compensates the worker for the reduction in the expected
bonus compensation (which amounts to ρs) and the expected costs of the social penalty
(which equals (1 − ρ)s). By contrast, if style U is implemented under non-competitive
wage-setting (i.e., w > u), the principal only has to increase the base salary if s is so
large that it exceeds the worker’s rent, i.e., s > w− u, in which case the base salary has
to be raised by s− (w − u).
The adoption of unfriendly leadership thus entails an advantageous incentive effect
(the bonus can be lowered) as well as a detrimental participation effect (the base salary
has to be raised). The latter effect is less pronounced or may even disappear under
non-competitive wage-setting because a worker who earns a rent within an employment
relationship will not always be instantly driven away by the social disutility of unfriendly
leadership.





U + (1− ρ)k
l
U + ul = max{u+ s, w}+ c− ρs+ (1− ρ)k
l
U + ul.
Hence, comparing C0 and CU , it follows that when the worker is hired under com-
petitive wage-setting, implementing the unfriendly leadership style increases costs by
(1 − ρ)(klU + s), and thus is never a good idea. Even though style U motivates the
worker, it does so by inflicting harm to the worker, for which the principal needs to
offer compensation in order to satisfy the participation constraint. The bonus is a better
instrument because it motivates and brings an additional benefit to the worker, a benefit
that helps to satisfy the worker’s participation constraint.
However, if the worker is hired under non-competitive wage-setting and hence earns
a rent when no leadership style is used, the principal does not need to fully compensate
the worker for the harm inflicted by unfriendly leadership. Comparing C0 and CU for
the case w > u, the principal prefers style U to the benchmark under the following
condition:
(1− ρ)klU +max{s− (w − u), 0} < ρs, (U)
i.e., if the reduction in expected bonus pay, ρs, exceeds the expected leadership costs,
(1−ρ)klU , plus the increase in the worker’s base salary, given by max{s−(w−u), 0}. If the
expected bonus reduction exceeds the expected leadership costs, then style U dominates
the pure monetary incentives for a greater region among the other parameters the bigger
the difference between the wage floor w and the value of the worker’s outside option u.
This implies that a worker is more likely to be subject to style U if he is locked in
the current employment relationship because his labor market prospects are relatively
unattractive.
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The more the penalty harms the worker (the larger s), the more strongly the bonus
can be decreased. However, if s becomes too large, the participation effect may dominate,
reflected by the second term on the left-hand side of (U). The principal then has to
compensate the worker for unfriendly leadership through a higher base salary, which may
make this leadership style not profitable. As ρ approaches one, implying that output
is very responsive to effort, the leader always prefers style U over no leadership. The
reason is twofold. First, if the worker is very likely to produce a high output, it is very
unlikely that the leader has to undertake the unfriendly action and incur the respective
costs. Second, when the likelihood of high output is higher, the principal benefits more
from the bonus reduction.
Style U is never socially desirable because—besides the transfer of income between
the parties, which does not impact social welfare—it entails an expected utility loss of
(1−ρ)s for the worker and expected leadership costs of (1−ρ)klU for the leader. However,
as we have seen, the principal may nevertheless adopt this style under non-competitive
wage-setting in order to extract rents from the worker.
The following lemma summarizes our findings regarding style U .
Lemma 3 The principal prefers style U to pure monetary incentives if and only if con-
dition (U) holds. Accordingly, style U is implemented only under non-competitive wage-
setting and only if the worker’s labor market prospects are sufficiently unattractive (i.e.,
the rent w − u is large). Style U lowers the worker’s rent relative to pure monetary
incentives and is socially inefficient.
4.3.2 Leadership style UU
Under style UU , the leader scolds the worker independent of the realized output. The
style imposes a disutility on the worker and a cost on the leader without affecting the
bonus needed to elicit high effort. Therefore, style UU is dominated by pure monetary
incentives.15 Clearly, adoption of style UU would also be socially inefficient.
4.4 Carrot-and-stick leadership
Under carrot-and-stick leadership, style FU , the leader praises the worker if output
is high and scolds the worker if output is low. The style hence corresponds to the
simultaneous adoption of style F and style U . Using the analysis in Section 4.2.1 and
Section 4.3.1, it is straightforward to show that the optimal bonus and the optimal base
salary is:





15We nevertheless include the style here as it may be used once we allow for leader’s social preferences,
as we shall see in Section 5.
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respectively. Accordingly, relative to the benchmark, the principal can lower the worker’s
bonus by s + r but may have to adjust the base salary to compensate the worker for
enduring the leader’s unfriendliness in case of low output. Hence, the principal incurs
the following costs under style FU :
CFU = max{u+ s, w}+ c− ρ(s+ r) + ρk
h
F + (1− ρ)k
l
U + ul.
To understand when the principal prefers style FU to the benchmark, suppose that
style U dominates the benchmark case, i.e., condition (U) holds. Then, adopting style
F in addition to style U is beneficial if and only if (F ) holds. Similarly, suppose that
style F dominates the benchmark case, i.e., condition (F ) holds. Then, adopting style
U in addition to style F is beneficial if and only if (U) holds. Thus, overall, style FU
dominates the benchmark (as well as style U and style F ) if and only if both conditions
(F ) and (U) hold at the same time. It follows that the principal adopts style FU only
under non-competitive wage-setting. Analogous to style U , style FU lowers the worker’s
utility and is socially inefficient.
Lemma 4 The principal prefers style FU to pure monetary incentives if and only if both
conditions (F ) and (U) hold, which is possible only under non-competitive wage-setting.
Adoption of style FU lowers the worker’s rent relative to pure monetary incentives and
is socially inefficient.
4.5 Optimal choice between leadership styles
4.5.1 Competitive wage-setting
We now turn to the principal’s optimal choice between different leadership styles and first
consider competitive wage-setting, i.e., the case where u ≥ w. The previous analysis has
shown that only the friendly styles F and FF can dominate pure monetary incentives
in this case. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that wage-setting is competitive, i.e., u ≥ w. If r ≤ khF , the
worker is motivated by pure monetary incentives. If r > khF , the principal implements a
friendly leadership style. Style FF is optimal if
(1− ρ)klF < min{r, u− w} − ρr
holds. Otherwise, style F is optimal.
Proposition 1 shows that when there is no wage floor (w = −∞) or the wage floor
is sufficiently low, the principal implements style FF provided that the leader’s costs
of being friendly are not prohibitively high in case of low output, i.e., klF < r, whereas
17
the principal implements style F if khF < r ≤ k
l
F . If none of these conditions hold (i.e.,
r ≤ khF ), the principal refrains from implementing any friendly style. In that case, the
worker simply does not appreciate praise enough to make up for the costs of the leader
to provide praise. If the wage floor is close to the worker’s outside option, the wage
constraint may affect the implemented leadership style. The existence of a wage floor
may make it optimal for the principal to announce style F even if klF < r. This happens
when the principal cannot fully capture the worker’s utility gain from receiving praise
unconditionally without violating the wage constraint. Hence, we find that, at least for
some range, the higher the worker’s outside option relative to the wage floor, the greater
the region among the other parameters for which leadership style FF dominates.
4.5.2 Non-competitive wage-setting
When wage-setting is non-competitive, i.e., w > u, the previous analysis implies that
style F , style U , and style FU are candidates for the overall optimal leadership style. It
will turn out that the following condition on the worker’s rent in the benchmark case,
given by w − u, is crucial for the optimal choice of the leadership style:
(1− ρ)(s+ klU ) < w − u (U
′)
The following proposition characterizes the principal’s optimal choice of a leadership
style under non-competitive wage-setting.









≥ ρ1−ρ . Then pure monetary incentives dominate the









< ρ1−ρ and condition (U
′) holds, the principal imple-
ments style FU . Otherwise, the principal implements style F .
(iii) Suppose that neither case (i) nor case (ii) applies. If condition (U ′) holds, the
principal implements style U . Otherwise, the principal implements pure monetary
incentives.
Figure 1 illustrates the findings presented in Proposition 2. From the above analysis,
in particular conditions (F ) and (U), it follows that, compared to the benchmark of pure
monetary incentives, style F is profitable if and only if khF /r < 1, whereas a necessary
condition for style U to be profitable is that klU/s < ρ/(1 − ρ). Hence, in case (i) of
Proposition 2, both leadership styles as well as their combination, the carrot-and-stick
style FU , are too costly relative to their benefits and the worker should be motivated







Style F. Pure monetary
incentives.
If condition (U´)




holds, style FU. 
Otherwise, style F.
Figure 1: Optimal leadership styles under non-competitive wage-setting
Case (ii) of the proposition describes a situation in which style F always dominates
pure monetary incentives. Combining style F and U , i.e., adopting style FU , becomes
optimal when the cost-benefit ratio of style U is also sufficiently low and the worker’s
rent w − u is sufficiently high.
Finally, case (iii) characterizes the optimal leadership style when style F is dominated




< ρ1−ρ . Now style U will be the only profitable leadership style provided that the
worker’s rent is sufficiently high. Case (iii) in particular implies that, even if styles F
and U are equally costly to implement (i.e., khF = k
l
U ) and equally effective at reducing
the worker’s bonus (i.e., r = s), style U can be the only profitable leadership style.





′) holds. A necessary
condition for such a situation to arise is that high output is more likely than low output
(i.e., ρ > 1/2). Style U then has the comparative advantage that leadership costs arise
relatively infrequently because the worker is likely to be successful.
Overall, the results presented in Proposition 2 lead to a clear prediction regarding
the adoption of non-monetary leadership actions under non-competitive wage-setting:
The worse the worker’s labor market prospects, i.e., the higher w − u, the greater the
region among the other parameters for which the principal wants the leader to engage in
unfriendly actions after observing low output. Moreover, comparing Propositions 1 and
2, the prediction follows that non-competitive wage-setting makes it more likely that a
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leadership style that involves unfriendly actions in response to low output is adopted.
4.6 Self-enforcing leadership in repeated interactions
The previous analysis has abstracted from the leader’s problem to commit to adopting a
given leadership style. We now address this issue by integrating long-term reputational
concerns of the leader in our analysis. For simplicity, we assume that, at stage 0, the
principal can sell the firm to the leader and extract all future leader rents. We thus
assume that there are leaders with sufficient wealth to buy the firm. This assumption
implies that our previous three-tier hierarchy can be simplified to a two-tier hierarchy
with a leader and a worker, where the leader wants to minimize the costs of incentivizing
the worker. This simplification is the easiest way to induce reputational concerns on the
side of the leader.
We assume that the leader needs to hire a worker for an infinite number of periods and
has a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Workers live for one period only and are then replaced
by a new worker, who learns the history of the game. This assumption again simplifies
the analysis as we exclude the threat of dismissal as an incentive device (Shapiro and
Stiglitz 1984). Alternatively, we can assume that firing workers is prohibitively costly.
We restrict attention to stationary contracts where the leader offers the same contract to
each worker. When the leader offers a contract, she can also announce a leadership style.
The worker believes that the leader will implement the announced style if she has also
complied with her announcement in the past. If the leader reneges on the announcement,
the worker believes that she will never again implement a leadership style. When, after
output has been realized, the leader considers whether or not to undertake a leadership
action, she thus weighs the costs of this action against the benefits of being able to
incentivize the worker through leadership actions in the future. If the leader finds it in
her best interest to comply with her announcement of a leadership style, we will say that
the leadership style is self-enforcing.
In this environment, we can derive the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the leader owns the firm and interacts repeatedly with work-
ers in the manner described above. Suppose that a leadership style LS ∈ {FF, F, U, FU}
dominates pure monetary incentives. Then there is a threshold δLS ∈ (0, 1) such that
the leadership style is self-enforcing for all discount factors δ ≥ δLS.
According to Proposition 3, if a leadership style dominates pure monetary incen-
tives, the leadership style will be self-enforcing for sufficiently high discount factors
or, in other words, when the leader sufficiently cares about future wage costs. Hence,
our previous results on the optimal leadership style stated in Proposition 1 hold for
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all δ ≥ max{δF , δFF }, whereas the results stated in Proposition 2 hold for all δ ≥
max{δF , δU , δFU}.
The proof of Proposition 3 further shows that, whether style F is self-enforcing or
not is independent of labor-market conditions as characterized by w and u. By contrast,
unconditional friendliness, style FF , is self-enforcing for (weakly) lower δ when u − w
increases, i.e., if the worker’s labor market prospects become more attractive. The reason
is that the leader can then save more wage costs by always being friendly, which makes
it easier to commit to style FF . Moreover, a leadership style that involves unfriendly
actions becomes self-enforcing for lower values of δ when w−u increases, i.e., the worker’s
labor market prospects deteriorate. In this case, the leader benefit. Finally, unfriendly
leadership actions may be self-enforcing when friendly leadership actions are not and
vice versa.
5 Optimal leadership styles when the leader has social
preferences
We now incorporate social preferences of the leader in our analysis and return to a single-
period setting. However, in contrast to the single-period setting studied in Section 4,
we no longer assume that the leader simply follows the principal’s announced leadership
style. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. In Section 5.1, we examine how the principal
can ensure self-enforcement of a given leadership style by hiring a leader from a certain
range of leader types. In Section 5.2, we derive the principal’s total costs of implementing
a given leadership style, taking into account that different leader types demand different
wages. Finally, in Section 5.3, we characterize the principal’s optimal choice of leadership
style.
5.1 Social preferences and self-enforcement of leadership styles
After the worker’s output has been observed, the leader can freely choose between three
actions: she can praise the worker, scold the worker, or refrain from undertaking any
leadership actions. The leader will engage in a leadership action if doing so strictly
increases her utility. Using the leader’s utility function specified in Section 3, it follows
that this is the case if the following condition holds:
−(1− θ)(cost of leadership action) + θ(utility of leadership action for the worker) > 0.
Accordingly, because engaging in leadership actions is costly, the leader may praise the
worker only if she is altruistic towards the worker (i.e., θ > 0). Moreover, because the
leader values her own net payoff at least as much as the worker’s utility (i.e., θ ≤ 1/2),
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for the leader to praise it is necessary that her costs do not exceed the worker’s benefit
from praise, r. Also, an altruistic leader will never scold the worker. The leader will
scold the worker only if she is spiteful so that reducing the worker’s utility pleases the
leader (i.e., θ < 0) and, moreover, the worker’s associated utility loss, s, exceeds the
leader’s costs. Spiteful leaders never praise.
More precisely, assuming that r ≥ klF and s > k
h














we obtain the following relationship between the leader’s type θ and her leadership
actions: A very altruistic leader of type θ > θFF always praises the worker regardless
of his output. A leader of type θ = θFF praises the worker if output is high but is
indifferent between praising and not praising the worker if output is low. A moderately
altruistic leader with θ ∈ (θF , θFF ) will praise the worker if and only if output is high.
A leader of type θ = θF is indifferent between praising and not praising the worker if
output is high and will not undertake a leadership action in case of low output.
Very spiteful leaders with θ < θUU always scold the worker, whereas moderately
spiteful leaders of type θ ∈ (θUU , θU ) scold the worker if and only if output is low. A
leader of type θ = θUU scolds when output is low but is indifferent between scolding and
not scolding the worker if output is high. A leader of type θ = θU is indifferent between
scolding and not scolding the worker if output is low and will not engage in a leadership
action in case of high output.
Leaders with relatively weak social preferences (i.e., θ ∈ (θU , θF )) neither praise nor
scold regardless of the worker’s output. Note that this range of leader types includes the
selfish leader studied in the previous section.
We assume that, if the leader is indifferent between different leadership actions and
one of these actions is in line with the style that the principal announced at stage 2,
the leader will comply with the principal’s announcement. In addition, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 1 We assume that s > khU and θ ≤ θUU , implying that there exist leader
types that scold the worker irrespective of output. Furthermore, we assume that r ≥ klF
and θ̄ = 1/2, implying that there exist leader types that praise the worker irrespective of
output.
We thus obtain the following result on the self-enforcement of leadership styles in
one-period employment relationships.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The principal can ensure self-enforcement
of ...
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(i) ... style FF by hiring a very altruistic leader of type θ ≥ θFF .
(ii) ... style F by hiring a moderately altruistic leader of type θ ∈ [θF , θFF ].
(iii) ... style U by hiring a moderately spiteful leader of type θ ∈ [θUU , θU ].
(iv) ... style UU by hiring a very spiteful leader of type θ ≤ θUU .
Leadership style FU is never self-enforcing. No leadership style is self-enforcing when
the leader has relatively weak social preferences, i.e., θ ∈ [θU , θF ].
Lemma 5 shows that, if the principal wants to implement a given leadership style
besides style FU , he can ensure that this leadership style is self-enforcing by hiring from
a certain range of leader types. In particular, if the costs of leadership actions depend on






U and consequently θF < θFF , θUU < θU , then
a range of moderately altruistic and moderately spiteful leader types will adopt style
F and style U , respectively. No leader type will adopt the carrot-and-stick leadership
style FU , i.e., praise the worker if output is high and scold the worker if output is low
because it needs an altruistic leader to praise but a spiteful leader to scold.16
5.2 The principal’s costs for a given leadership style
The analysis in the previous subsection has shown that the principal may hire from a
range of leader types to make a given leadership style self-enforcing. As different leader
types may request different wages for adopting the same leadership style, we now discuss
what type of leader the principal should hire to minimize total wage costs for a given
leadership style LS, where LS ∈ {FF, F, U, UU, 0}. Here, 0 stands for our benchmark
case where the worker is motivated by monetary incentives only. As the carrot-and-stick
style FU is never self-enforcing according to Lemma 5, we henceforth neglect this style.
The following lemma shows that the optimal leader type crucially depends on how
the leader’s labor-market prospects, characterized by her reservation utility ul, compare
to the worker’s labor-market conditions, characterized by u and w.
Lemma 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. In order to ensure that a given leadership
style LS ∈ {FF, F, U, UU, 0} is self-enforcing and to minimize total wage costs for the
16Slightly extending our model, the principal could implement style FU by hiring two leaders, a
moderately spiteful one and a moderately altruistic one. We exclude this case from our analysis by
assuming that hiring two leaders is prohibitively costly, i.e., u
l
is too large. Self-enforcement of style FU
may also be ensured when leaders are motivated by reciprocity, which is absent in our model.
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style, the principal hires the following leader type θ∗LS:
θ∗FF =
{






























where uLSw denotes the worker’s expected utility under leadership style LS, with u
FF
w =
max{u,w+ r}, uFw = u
0




w = max{u,w− s}. The principal’s
wage costs for style LS, denoted by ĈLS, are:
ĈFF = c+max{u− r, w}+
[











































ĈUU = c+max{u+ s, w}+
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Inspecting the principal’s total costs for leadership style LS, given by ĈLS , the
respective term in square brackets corresponds to the leader’s wage. Accordingly, to
ensure that the leader accepts the contract, the leader is compensated for her expected
costs of undertaking leadership actions and receives an additional payment that depends
on her type, her reservation utility, and the worker’s expected utility in the employment
relationship, uLSw . We refer to this additional payment as the leader’s wage net of
leadership costs. To implement a given leadership style, the principal hires the leader
type that minimizes this payment.
Regarding the optimal leader type, two different cases occur. In the first case, the
leader’s reservation utility and hence also her expected utility when she works for the
principal is at least as high as the worker’s expected utility, ul ≥ u
LS
w . In this situation,
according to Lemma 6, the principal hires the lowest type θ that is still willing to engage
in the given style LS.17 The reason is that inequality which is advantageous for the
leader is valued more by more spiteful leaders and disliked less by less altruistic leaders.
Consequently, lower types request lower wages. This relationship further implies that
the principal prefers a leader with social preferences even if the worker’s incentives are
purely monetary. The principal then hires the most spiteful leader that still refrains
17Only if u
l
= uLSw , is the principal indifferent between all leader types that implement the given style.
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from scolding the worker when output is low (i.e., θ∗0 = θU ).
In the second case, the worker’s utility exceeds the leader’s reservation utility, ul <
uLSw . Such a situation can arise when the worker possesses general human capital that
is in high demand on the labor market, but workers with such skills are scarce. For
example, a researcher in an R&D department may have better outside options than the
department leader, which implies that ul < u
LS
w . The principal then hires the least
spiteful or most altruistic type that will adopt a given style. In particular, to implement
the benchmark case with pure monetary incentives for the worker, the principal hires
the most altruistic type that still refrains from praising the worker when output is high
(i.e., θ∗0 = θF ).
Overall, these results imply that the principal faces a trade-off between ensuring self-
enforcement of a given leadership style and minimizing the leader’s wage net of leadership
costs. On the one hand, if leaders are better off than workers, the most spiteful leader
type, θ = θ, enjoys this situation most and therefore requires the lowest wage net of
leadership costs. However, this type will always adopt style UU . If the principal wishes
to induce a different style, he has to hire a less spiteful leader and pay her a higher wage
net of leadership costs. On the other hand, if the worker is better off than the leader,
the most altruistic leader type, θ = θ̄, feels most comfortable with this type of inequality
and thus accepts the lowest wage net of leadership costs, but will always adopt style
FF . Adopting less friendly styles that allow lowering the worker’s bonus then requires
hiring a different type of leader and paying her a higher wage net of leadership costs.
5.3 Optimal choice between leadership styles
We now describe the principal’s optimal choice of the leadership style or, equivalently, the
leader’s type. Our analysis in the foregoing section has shown that, when deciding what
type of leader to hire and hence what leadership style to implement, the principal needs
to optimally balance a trade-off between ensuring self-enforcement of a given leadership
style and minimizing the leader’s wage net of leadership costs. We will focus our analysis
on how optimally balancing the trade-off is affected by labor market characteristics
as described by the worker’s reservation utility u, the wage floor w, and the leader’s
reservation utility ul. We denote the overall optimal leader type by θ
∗, from which the
implemented leadership style follows according to Lemma 5.
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5.3.1 Competitive wage-setting
Under competitive wage-setting, w ≤ u, the results presented in Lemma 6 provide us
with the following total costs that the principal incurs to induce a given leadership style:
ĈFF = c+max{u− r, w}+
[







FF max{u,w + r})
]
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ĈUU = c+ u+ s+
[










To simplify the exposition, let wcl (θ) :=
1
1−θ (ul − θu) denote the leader’s wage net of
leadership costs for LS ∈ {UU,U, F, 0} and, in case u ≥ w + r, also for LS = FF .
We first focus on a situation where the worker has a lower reservation utility than
the leader, u ≤ ul. In the special case where the leader and the worker have the same
reservation utility, u = ul, we obtain that the leader’s wage net of leadership costs is
independent of the leader’s type, wcl (θ) = ul for all θ and for all LS ∈ {UU,U, F, 0} and,
if u ≥ w+r, also for LS = FF . In these situations, the principal’s costs are thus identical
to the case with a selfish leader, ĈLS = CLS . Intuitively, as the leader’s expected net
payoff equals the worker’s expected utility, the leader’s social preferences do not affect
the costs of hiring the leader. Only if u < w+ r and thus the worker earns a rent under
style FF , the principal minimizes costs for style FF by hiring an altruistic leader with
θ = θ̄. From our analysis in Section 4.3 it follows that, for competitive wage-setting
with u = ul, the unfriendly leadership styles U and UU are always dominated by pure
monetary incentives. Moreover, from Proposition 1 and r ≥ khF , we obtain that hiring an
altruistic leader who engages in friendly leadership leads to lower costs for the principal
than using pure monetary incentives to motivate the worker. It is straightforward to
verify that, given our assumptions that r ≥ klF and θ̄ = 1/2, style FF dominates style
F irrespective of whether u ≥ w + r holds or not. Hence, when u = ul, the principal
minimizes her costs by hiring the most altruistic leader type, θ∗ = θ̄.
If, however, u < ul, the leader’s wage net of leadership costs, w
c
l (θ), is increasing in
θ, which makes hiring less spiteful or more altruistic leaders more costly relative to a
situation where u = ul. Therefore, to induce a given leadership style, the principal will
hire the lowest leader type θ who still engages in the style. In addition, observe that the


















It follows that, as ul increases starting from ul = u, the principal will at some point decide
to hire a less altruistic leader, i.e., switch from style FF to style F . As ul continues
to increase, the principal will switch to pure monetary incentives, then to style U , and
finally even to style UU . The reason is that spiteful leaders enjoy inequality that is
advantageous for them and thus request lower wages net of leadership costs, so that
style U and style UU become profitable when ul − u is sufficiently high. The principal
then finds it optimal to accept an unfriendly style even though the worker’s expected
compensation has to increase to reimburse the worker for enduring the unfriendly leader.

















Thus, if u decreases starting from u = ul, this also favors a switch from friendly leadership
to pure monetary incentives and then to style U and style UU . However, as u ≥ w̄, there
is a lower bound on u so that these switches do not necessarily occur at some point. The
following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Suppose that wage-setting is competitive and leaders have weakly better
outside options than workers, w ≤ u ≤ ul, and Assumption 1 holds. If u = ul, the princi-
pal will hire the most altruistic leader type, θ∗ = θ̄, who implements style FF . However,
as ul increases or u decreases, the overall optimal leader type θ
∗ weakly decreases.
Proposition 4 reveals another reason why workers with poor labor market prospects
can be subject to unfriendly leadership. An environment where workers’ reservation
utilities are relatively low compared to those of leaders attracts spiteful leaders in the
sense that they are willing to perform the job for lower wages, and these leader types
will engage in unfriendly actions.
Now consider a situation where workers have higher reservation utilities than leaders,
u > ul. The leader’s wage net of leadership costs, w
c
l (θ), is now decreasing in the leader’s
type because less spiteful or more altruistic leaders are more comfortable with a situation
where workers are better off than themselves. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that wage-setting is competitive and leaders have worse outside
options than workers, w ≤ u and u > ul, and Assumption 1 holds. The principal always
hires an altruistic leader of type θ∗ = θ̄, who implements style FF .
Hence, workers in a competitive labor market who have better labor market prospects
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than their leaders will always be subject to unconditional friendly leadership, implying
that only monetary incentives are used to motivate these workers.
5.3.2 Non-competitive wage-setting
Under non-competitive wage-setting, w > u, by Lemma 6, we obtain for the principal’s
total cost under each leadership style:
ĈFF = c+ w +
[







FF (w + r))
]
,




















(ul − θUU max{u,w − s})
]
,
ĈUU = c+max{u+ s, w}+
[





(ul − θmax{u,w − s})
]
.
When we neglect the leader’s wage net of leadership costs for a moment or, equiva-
lently, suppose that it is constant for all types, we can show that, given our Assumption
1, the principal minimizes his total costs by implementing either LS = U or LS = F ,
where the implementation of style U can be optimal only if w − u is sufficiently high.18
Thus, the main insight from Proposition 2, that a high worker rent in the benchmark can
lead to unfriendly leadership, carries over to a situation where style FU is not available.
To understand the impact of the leader’s social preferences on the principal’s total
costs, recall that the wage floor constraint is never binding for the leader and hence ul ≥
w. The leader thus obtains a higher utility than the worker under all leadership styles
besides, possibly, the unconditional friendly style FF where the worker’s expected utility
is w+ r. It thus follows from Lemma 6 that, under all styles besides, possibly, style FF ,
the principal minimizes wage costs by hiring the lowest type θ that engages in this style.
Moreover, the leader’s wage net of leadership costs decreases from LS = F to LS = 0,
from LS = 0 to LS = U , and from LS = U to LS = UU . This particularly implies that,
even though we focus on a situation where the worker’s utility gain from being praised
in case of high output exceeds the leader’s associated costs, r ≥ khF (by Assumption
1), style F does not necessarily dominate pure monetary incentives because, net of
leadership costs, hiring an altruistic leader is more expensive than hiring a spiteful leader.
Moreover, besides potentially reducing the worker’s expected compensation (compare
Section 4.3.1), style U now has the additional comparative advantage that it allows
the principal to hire a more spiteful leader, θ = θUU , who earns a lower wage net of
18We provide a proof in Online Appendix A.
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leadership costs than a less spiteful or altruistic leader that is needed for LS = 0 or
LS = F , respectively. If the most spiteful leader type, θ = θ, accepts a sufficiently
lower wage than type θ = θUU , the principal will even prefer style UU to style U . In
addition, style FF can also be profitable. Comparing the costs under style F and FF ,
we have ĈFF < ĈF if unconditional friendly leadership lowers the wage of type θ = θ
∗
FF
sufficiently strongly relative to type θ = θF due to the worker’s higher utility under FF
than under F .
In spite of the rich set of potentially optimal leadership styles, changes in the worker’s
and the leader’s reservation utility have a clear-cut effect on the relative attractiveness
of the leadership styles for the principal. If the worker’s reservation utility increases, so







> 0 for u+ s ≥ w.
Otherwise, the principal’s costs are unaffected by changes in u. Intuitively, if u+ s ≥ w,
the analysis in Section 4.3.1 has shown that the principal has to (partially) compen-
sate the worker for unfriendly leadership by raising his wage relative to LS = 0, and
this wage raise needs to be higher when the worker’s outside option improves. At the
same time, hiring a spiteful leader becomes more costly as the worker’s utility increases
relative to the leader’s payoff. Hence, the overall optimal leader type is weakly increas-
ing in the worker’s reservation utility. Moreover, the overall optimal leader type θ∗
is weakly decreasing in the leader’s reservation utility as (Rl) continues to hold under
non-competitive wage-setting. Intuitively, the higher the leader’s reservation utility, the
better off will be the leader relative to the worker, which makes hiring low leader types
relatively less costly. The following proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 6 Suppose wage-setting is non-competitive, u < w, and Assumption 1
holds. The overall optimal leader type θ∗ is weakly decreasing in ul and weakly increasing
in u.
We can thus conclude that the comparative statics with respect to the worker’s
reservation utility are identical to the setting where only a selfish leader is available,
which we have discussed in Section 4.5.2: When workers have better outside options,
the implementation of unfriendly leadership styles becomes relatively more costly for the
principal so that the adoption of friendly styles becomes more likely. By contrast, when
leaders have better outside options, the unfriendly styles become less costly to implement
for the principal and hence occur for a greater region among the other parameters.
The impact of an increase of the wage floor on the optimal leadership style is some-
what more involved. Inspecting the principal’s costs under pure monetary incentives as
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i.e., a higher wage floor increases the principal’s costs, but less so if he hires higher
leader types. Intuitively, when the leader is altruistic, her wage can be lowered when
the wage floor goes up, and the more so the more altruistic the leader. The impact of
a higher w on the costs of the unfriendly styles depends on whether or not u + s > w
holds. If u + s > w, the principal’s costs for the unfriendly styles, ĈU and ĈUU , are
not affected by a marginal increase of the wage floor because, in this case, unfriendly
leadership eliminates the worker’s rent so that he earns his reservation utility. Overall,
















By contrast, if u+ s ≤ w, a higher wage floor translates into a higher utility for the
worker also under unfriendly leadership. A spiteful leader thus demands a higher wage
and, the more spiteful the leader, the more strongly her wage needs to increase when
















which implies that the optimal leader type is weakly increasing in w. These results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose wage-setting is non-competitive, u < w, and Assumption 1
holds. If u + s > w, an increase of the wage floor makes the adoption of an unfriendly
leadership style optimal for a greater region among the other parameters. By contrast,
if u+ s ≤ w, the optimal leader type is weakly increasing in w.
Consequently, in contrast to the case where only a selfish leader is available, the
impact of a wage-floor raise on the optimal leadership style is not clear-cut when leaders
have social preferences. If the wage floor is relatively low (i.e., u+s > w), a higher wage
floor makes the implementation of unfriendly leadership optimal for a greater region
among the other parameters, as it is the case with a selfish leader (compare Section 4.5.2).
If, however, the wage floor is sufficiently high (i.e., u+ s ≤ w) so that the worker’s rent
is not completely eliminated under unfriendly leadership, a higher wage floor promotes
friendly leadership styles because hiring altruistic leaders becomes relatively less costly.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model so as to analyze optimal leadership styles under
different labor-market conditions. We have examined two leadership actions differing in
their non-monetary consequences for workers (positive or negative). We have seen that—
when leaders have no social preferences—leadership styles that are harmful to workers are
only applied when wage-setting is non-competitive. The reason is that, with competitive
wage-setting, workers need to be compensated for any harm that the leader imposes on
them, making incentive pay a superior instrument to motivate workers. However, when
wage-setting is non-competitive, full compensation is not needed as workers earn a rent,
implying that firms may use unfriendly leadership actions, despite them being socially
inefficient. Unfriendly leadership in such markets enables the firm to extract rents from
the worker. On the other hand, we have shown that a conditionally friendly leadership
style that both motivates and benefits workers is applied whenever it is socially efficient,
independent of the wage-setting conditions. The reason is that this style allows the firm
to reduce incentive pay both in the presence and in the absence of a binding wage floor.
In our model, worker rents arise from non-competitive wage setting and are enhanced
because the principal needs to provide the worker with monetary incentives to induce
high effort. In Online Appendix C, we show that unfriendly leadership actions also
become more prevalent when rents stem from other sources, e.g., firm-specific charac-
teristics that make it attractive for the worker to be employed at the principal’s firm.
When leaders cannot credibly commit to a leadership style, hiring a leader with the
“right” social preferences makes all leadership styles feasible except for the carrot-and-
stick leadership style that uses both positive and negative leadership actions. Social
preferences of leaders have further consequences for the wage costs of hiring the leader.
Altruistic leaders suffer when the wage of the worker is relatively low, whereas spiteful
leaders actually enjoy this. This provides a second reason for why worse labor mar-
ket prospects of workers make it more likely that workers are exposed to unfriendly
leadership styles.
In addition to concerns about social efficiency, the use of unfriendly leadership styles
may also raise equity concerns. Our theory predicts that leadership styles involving
unfriendly actions are more likely used when wage-setting is non-competitive, such as
when a legal minimum wage binds or when trade unions have negotiated agreements that
imply wage floors that, at the same time, lead to unemployment so that workers’ outside
options are poor. Such arrangements are commonly more relevant in the bottom half of
the income distribution. As a result, it might be that workers in this part of the income
distribution are more likely to suffer from unfriendly leadership styles, exacerbating the
inequality in well-being in society.
More generally, our model predicts a higher prevalence of friendly leadership styles
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in free-market economies. Interestingly, while markets the last 40 years have played an
increasingly important role in managing and allocating resources in Western economies
(in particular in the euro zone), we have also seen a trend from “hard” to “soft” leadership
styles within firms and organizations. Autocratic leadership styles have been replaced by
more democratic, inclusive, and relational leadership styles (Avolio et al. 2009),19 and
there has been an increased focus on leaders’ and workers’ social competence (Deming
2017). Although no causal relationships have been established, cross-country studies on
leadership differences indicate a higher prevalence of softer and more inclusive leadership
styles in individualistic, market-oriented societies (see, e.g., Boltanski and Chiapello
2007, Dorfman et al. 2012, and Lonati 2020). Although these styles are different from
the styles we study, a mechanism similar to ours might be in place as the delegation of
decision-making authority can be a motivation device (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1997 and
Fehr et al. 2013).
The opportunity to use leadership as a motivational tool may also have other policy
implications. Take the recent discussion about bonus caps for, among others, bankers
(see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2016). A concern raised about bonus caps in policy
discussions and in the literature is that it may diminish incentives to work hard. Our
analysis yields an additional concern, namely that the principal (e.g., the bankers’ boss)
may start using unfriendly leadership to compensate for the restrictions put on the use
of monetary incentives.
We hope that our analysis will give rise to further theoretical explorations as well
as to empirical testing of our key predictions. Theoretically, it would be interesting
to extend the model to a general-equilibrium setting, where unemployment arises in
equilibrium due to, e.g., a legal minimum wage or trade-union involvement in wage-
setting. Unfriendly leadership may in such a richer setting be less inefficient than in the
partial equilibrium setting studied in this paper (or may even be constrained efficient),
as it may mitigate other distortions. For instance, the distortionary effect of a legal
minimum wage on unemployment may be lower when employers have the opportunity
to use unfriendly leadership. Another important avenue for future theoretical research
is to investigate the ethical and legal considerations involved in the choice of leadership
style. Some of these considerations can be captured by variables that are already defined
in our model (e.g., the personal moral cost of scolding can be part of the leader’s utility
cost of taking an unfriendly leadership action). Other ethical and legal issues call for
an extension of the model, e.g., the principal’s indirect responsibility for unfriendly
leadership actions and the socially optimal design of the working conditions legislation.
19This overall trend towards a “softer,” more collaborative approach to leadership is also captured by
developments in relational (Uhl-Bien 2006), responsible (Maak and Pless 2006), shared and distributed
(Pearce et al. 2003), and collective leadership (Quick 2017). We thank Rune Todnem By for pointing us
to these studies.
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Empirically, it would be interesting to see whether there is a link between wage-
setting institutions or firm-specific characteristics (as discussed in Online Appendix C)
and styles of leadership. Similarly, as already mentioned in the Introduction, our model
predicts that industries that exhibit high costs of failure may be more prone to use
unfriendly leadership styles than industries where costs of failure are low because negative
wage floors may be binding only in the former case. Also, one could collect data on the
social preferences of leaders (using questionnaire data or incentivized games, such as in
Andreoni and Miller 2002 and Falk et al. 2018) and examine how these preferences relate
to the rents earned by the workers they lead and the leadership styles they employ. One
could take our predictions to the lab, creating labor markets with competitive wage-
setting and ones with wage floors, seeing whether the choice of leadership styles by
participants in the role of leaders is affected by this, and how the choice of leadership
style depends on the participants’ social preferences, as in Kocher et al. (2013).
Lastly, it would be interesting to further expand the growing evidence base on the
causal effects of leadership styles in the field (see Grant and Gino 2010, Kosfeld and
Neckermann 2011, Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015, Kvaløy et al. 2015, Antonakis et al. 2015,
Bradler et al. 2016, and Englmaier et al. 2018). According to our theoretical analysis,
such studies should also pay attention to employees’ willingness to stay with their current
employer (as measured by questionnaires or using data on voluntary quits) in addition
to their motivation and performance. Our theory predicts that the effects of unfriendly
leadership on employee retention are most pronounced in competitive labor markets.20
20Relatedly, Lott-Lavigna (2018) suggests that the “angry chef culture” in the UK will die out when
restaurants face a staff shortage as a consequence of the Brexit.
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Supplementary material to be published in an online ap-
pendix
Online Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider the case r ≤ khF . By (F ), style F is dominated
by pure monetary incentives. From min{r, u − w} ≤ r and khF ≤ ρk
h
F + (1 − ρ)k
l
F , it
follows that (FF ) is not satisfied, which implies that style FF is also dominated by pure
monetary incentives.
Now consider the case r > khF . By (F ), style F dominates pure monetary incentives.
By (FF ), style FF also dominates pure monetary incentives iff
(1− ρ)klF < min{r, u− w} − ρk
h
F .
Moreover, comparing CF and CFF , style FF dominates style F iff
max{u− r, w}+ ρkhF + (1− ρ)k
l
F < −ρ(r − k
h
F ) + u
⇔ (1− ρ)klF < min{r, u− w} − ρr.
Overall, style FF dominates both style F and pure monetary incentives iff
(1− ρ)klF < min{min{r, u− w} − ρk
h
F ,min{r, u− w} − ρr} = min{r, u− w} − ρr.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that condition (U) holds if and only if the






, (1− ρ)(s+ klU ) < w − u.
Case (i) of the proposition thus immediately follows from conditions (F ) and (U) as well
as Lemma 4.
Now consider case (ii). By condition (F ), style F dominates the benchmark of
pure monetary incentives. From Lemma 4 and condition (U), additionally engaging in




< ρ1−ρ and (U
′) holds.
The claim thus follows.
Finally, consider case (iii). From (F ) and Lemma 4, neither style F nor style FU are
profitable relative to pure monetary incentives. The claim thus follows from condition
(U).
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Proof of Proposition 3. We first address the question when—given that implement-
ing a given leadership style is worthwhile relative to the benchmark with pure monetary
incentives—the leadership style is also self-enforcing. First consider the conditional
friendly leadership style F , and assume it is beneficial compared to the benchmark, i.e.,










ρ(r − khF ). (A1)
The condition reflects that the leader will comply with her announcement when her
short-term gain from non-compliance, khF , does not exceed her long-term loss, the term
on the right-hand side. If the leader deviates from her announcement, the worker cannot
be motivated by leadership anymore. Hence, the leader can only use monetary incentives
to induce high effort, implying that expected per-period wage costs increase by C0−CF .
Next consider unconditional friendly leadership, style FF , and assume it dominates
the benchmark of pure monetary incentives, i.e., condition (FF ) holds. Style FF is self-
enforcing if the leader finds it beneficial to undertake the friendly action even if output












(min{r, u− w} − ρkhF − (1− ρ)k
l
F ). (A2)
Condition (A1) shows that, whether style F is self-enforcing or not is independent
of labor-market conditions as characterized by w and u. By contrast, unconditional
friendliness, style FF , is self-enforcing for (weakly) lower δ when u−w increases, i.e., if
the worker’s labor market prospects become more attractive.
Now consider conditional unfriendly leadership, style U , and assume that this style






δt(C0 − CU ). (A3)
Inspection of C0 and CU shows that the difference between the two wage-cost functions


















Finally, consider the carrot-and-stick style FU and assume both (F ) and (U) hold,







δt(C0 − CFU )





(min{w − u− s, 0}+ ρ(s+ r)− ρkhF − (1− ρ)k
l
U ). (A6)
The conditions (A4), (A5), and (A6) indicate that a leadership style that involves
unfriendly actions becomes self-enforcing for lower values of δ when w−u increases, i.e.,
the worker’s labor market prospects deteriorate.
Overall, from conditions (A1)—(A6) it follows that, if a leadership style dominates
pure monetary incentives, the leadership style will be self-enforcing for sufficiently high
discount factors or, in other words, when the leader sufficiently cares about future wage
costs.
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix an arbitrary style LS ∈ {FF, F, U, UU, 0} and consider a
leader of type θ who will engage in this style, as described in Lemma 5. Defining uLSl as
the leader’s wage net of leadership costs and uLSw as the worker’s expected utility under
the style, the leader will accept the contract if and only if her expected utility is at least
as high as her reservation utility,
(1− θ)uLSl + θu
LS








The term uLSw is composed of the worker’s expected utility from the leadership actions,
his cost of effort, and his expected compensation under style LS. When the leader is
altruistic, she receives extra utility when the worker earns more, allowing the principal
to reduce the leader’s wage. However, to satisfy the leader’s participation constraint,
increasing the worker’s wage is (weakly) dominated by giving the money directly to the
leader because θ ≤ 1/2. When the leader is spiteful, she would prefer the worker to earn
less, which is however not possible without violating the worker’s incentive compatibility
constraint, wage floor constraint, or participation constraint. Hence, uLSw follows from
our analysis in Section 4, and the leader’s optimal wage is such that (A7) binds. The
optimal leader type, θ∗LS , thus minimizes the term on the right-hand side of (A7), subject
to the restriction that the type engages in style LS.
We first consider LS = 0. The leader’s participation constraint is given by
(1− θ)wl + θ(w




where max{u,w} corresponds to the worker’s expected utility u0w. Using Lemma 5, the
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The objective function is strictly increasing in θ if and only if ul > max{u,w} and
strictly decreasing in θ if and only if ul < max{u,w}, which implies:
θ∗0 =
{
θU if ul > max{u,w}
θF if ul < max{u,w}
If ul = max{u,w}, then θ
∗
0 can be any type θ ∈ [θU , θF ]. Hence, the results presented in
the lemma for LS = 0 follow.
Now consider LS = F . The leader’s participation constraint is
(1− θ)(wl − ρk
h








(ul − θmax{u,w}) + ρk
h
F ,
where max{u,w} corresponds to the worker’s expected utility uFw . The optimal leader













θF if ul ≥ max{u,w}
θFF , if ul < max{u,w}
and ĈF as given in the lemma. The results for LS ∈ {FF,U, UU} are derived analo-
gously.
Proof of Proposition 5. If w < u and ul < u, the principal’s cost functions become
ĈF = c+ u− ρ(r − k
h
F ) + w
c
l (θFF ),
Ĉ0 = c+ u+ w
c
l (θF ),





ĈUU = c+ u+ s+ ρk
h





We have wcl (θFF ) ≤ w
c
l (θF ) < w
c
l (θU ) ≤ w
c
l (θUU ) and hence, using also that r ≥ k
h
F ,
ĈF ≤ Ĉ0 < ĈU < ĈUU . It remains to show that ĈFF ≤ ĈF . For u ≥ w + r we obtain
ĈFF = c+ u− r + ρk
h






From wcl (θ̄) < w
c
l (θFF ) and r ≥ k
l
F it follows that ĈFF < ĈF . For u < w + r, using
θ̄ = 1/2, we have
ĈFF = c+ ρk
h
F + (1− ρ)k
l
F + 2ul − r = c− ρ(r − k
h
F )− (1− ρ)(r − k
l
F ) + 2ul.
For ĈF , using θFF = k
l
F /(r + k
l
F ), we obtain























u. Hence, because r ≥ klF , we
have ĈFF ≤ ĈF .
Optimal leadership styles for the case where w > u, θ = 0, and style FU is not
available. In this situation, the principal’s total costs are:
ĈFF = c+ w +
[










Ĉ0 = c+ w + ul,
ĈU = c+max{u+ s, w} − ρs+
[
(1− ρ)klU + ul
]
,
ĈUU = c+max{u+ s, w}+
[





Because ĈFF > ĈF and ĈUU > ĈU , the principal never implements styles FF and
UU . Because of Assumption 1, Ĉ0 ≥ ĈF so that pure monetary incentives are weakly
dominated by style F . Style U dominates style F iff:
max{u+ s, w} − ρs+ (1− ρ)klU < w − ρr + ρk
h
F .




klU < −r + k
h
F .
In case w < u+ s, the condition becomes:
(1− ρ)(s+ klU ) + ρ(r − k
h
F ) < w − u.
Hence, style U dominates style F either if
(1− ρ)(s+ klU ) + ρ(r − k
h
F ) < w − u < s
38
or if
s ≤ w − u and − s+
1− ρ
ρ




We now discuss how our assumption that the leader incurs costs when she engages in
leadership actions affects our results. Suppose that the leader does not incur any costs,






U = 0. If the principal hires a selfish leader, the leader will al-
ways follow the principal’s announced leadership style because she is indifferent between
undertaking and not undertaking any leadership action. Thus, the adoption of all leader-
ship styles is credible with a selfish leader in a one-shot interaction. Moreover, the results
presented in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 continue to hold for zero leadership costs.
Hence, unfriendly leadership is never used under competitive wage-setting. Moreover,
under non-competitive wage-setting and zero leadership costs, case (ii) of Proposition 2
applies, implying that unfriendly leadership actions continue to be optimal—as part of
leadership style FU—when the worker’s rent in the benchmark case is sufficiently high.
If the principal hires an altruistic leader, the leader will always praise the worker, i.e.,
implement leadership style FF . By contrast, if the principal hires a spiteful leader, the
leader will always scold the worker, i.e., adopt leadership style UU . The principal can
now benefit from hiring a leader with social preferences only if such a leader demands a
lower wage than a selfish leader because of income gaps between workers and leaders.
Online Appendix C
In the model presented in the main body of our paper, we have shown that the ex-
istence of worker rents may entail unfriendly leadership actions. These rents arise or
are amplified because the principal needs to provide the worker with effort incentives in
the presence of a wage floor.21 We now present a variant of our model where rents may
emerge due to exogenous firm characteristics instead of incentive provision. Nevertheless,
a wage floor remains essential in our analysis, as will become clear below.
As in Section 5, we consider a one-period employment relationship where the prin-
cipal may hire a leader with social preferences. In contrast to our previous setting, we
now assume that output is observable but not contractible so that the worker cannot be
21If effort was contractible, the principal could pay the worker a flat wage u+ c, so that a rent arises
if and only if w > u+ c. With non-contractible effort, however, a flat wage is not incentive compatible.
The worker therefore earns a rent for lower values of w, namely if and only if w > u, as we have shown
in Section 4.1.
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motivated through monetary incentives. Moreover, when the worker accepts the princi-
pal’s contract offer and works at the principal’s firm, he realizes an exogenous expected
benefit ∆, with 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆̄, which arises because of firm-specific characteristics. For
instance, the firm may allow the worker to acquire particularly valuable general human
capital, or offer unique networking opportunities, or allow the worker to signal a high
ability to future employers, all of which will lead to more attractive job opportunities in
the future. The firm could be a starred restaurant that allows the worker to learn from
its ingenious chef, or a research institution that offers access to a valuable network of
researchers, or a major law firm that allows the worker to work on high-profile cases.
The principal still wants the worker to exert high effort, but the worker can be
motivated only through leadership actions. We assume that both style U and style F
provide the worker with sufficient incentives to exert high effort, i.e., s, r ≥ c/ρ. As
a consequence, style FU is dominated because this style would only lead to additional
leadership costs compared to style F or style U . Moreover, the unconditional styles UU
and FF are not feasible because they cannot incentivize the worker. We can thus focus
on comparing the principal’s overall costs under style F and style U . For simplicity,
we further assume that styles F and U are equally effective regarding the provision of
incentives, i.e., s = r, and equally costly, i.e., khF = k
l
U =: k > 0. The benefit ∆ is
independent of the adopted leadership style. All other assumptions remain as specified
in Section 3.
Under style F , the worker’s wage w has to satisfy the following constraints:
w + ρr − c ≥ w,
w + ρr − c+∆ ≥ u,
w ≥ w.
The first constraint ensures that the worker will choose high instead of low effort and is
satisfied by assumption. The second constraint ensures the worker’s participation, and
the third constraint describes the wage floor. We thus obtain for the principal’s total
wage costs under style F , denoted ΓF :
ΓF = max{u+ c− ρr −∆, w}+ ρk +W
F
l .
WFl denotes the leader’s wage net of leadership costs. The worker earns a rent if and
only if u + c − ρr −∆ < w, i.e., if the extra benefit from working for the principal, ∆,
is sufficiently large. We assume that u+ c− ρr ≥ w, which implies that the worker does
not earn a rent when there is no extra benefit from working for the principal. In other
words, a wage floor alone does not lead to worker rents, but its existence is required
to obtain worker rents for sufficiently high ∆. Without a wage floor, the principal can
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always extract all rents from the worker, no matter how high those rents are. Arguably,
a wage floor exists for nearly every employment relationship.




(ul − θ̃F max{u,w + ρr − c+∆}).













Under style U , it needs to hold that:
w − (1− ρ)r − c ≥ w − r,
w − (1− ρ)r − c+∆ ≥ u,
w ≥ w.
For the principal’s total wage costs under style U , denoted ΓU , we obtain:
ΓU = max{u+ c+ (1− ρ)r −∆, w}+ (1− ρ)k +W
U
l .
Because we assume that u+ c− ρr > w, the worker does not earn a rent under style U
if ∆ = 0, but he earns a rent if u+ c+ (1− ρ)r−∆ < w. WUl denotes the leader’s wage




(ul − θ̃U max{u,w − (1− ρ)r − c+∆}).















Comparing ΓF and ΓU , we see that style F always leads to weakly lower wage pay-
ments to the worker than style U . However, the difference between the wage payments
depends on ∆ and will be eliminated if ∆ is sufficiently large because the worker then
obtains the lowest feasible wage w under either style.
In order to describe the principal’s optimal choice between leadership style, we define
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thresholds ∆F and ∆U ,
∆F := u+ c− ρr − w, ∆U := u+ c+ (1− ρ)r − w,
where it holds that 0 < ∆F < ∆U . We focus on a situation where the leader’s wage net
of leadership costs is higher under style F than under style U , i.e., WFl −W
U
l ≥ 0. This
is the case if the leader’s reservation utility is always weakly higher than the worker’s
net payoff, i.e., ul ≥ max{u,w + ρr − c+ ∆̄}.
We obtain the following result:
(i) If ∆ < ∆F , style U strictly dominates style F if and only if:





l is independent of ∆.
(ii) If ∆F ≤ ∆ < ∆U , style U strictly dominates style F if and only if:





l ) is increasing in ∆.
(iii) If ∆U < ∆, style U strictly dominates style F if and only if:





l is decreasing in ∆.
In case (i), the worker does not earn a rent under either style. Suppose for a moment
that ul = u, which implies that the leader’s wage net of leadership costs is independent
of his type, i.e., WFl = W
U
l . Necessary conditions for style U to dominate style F are
then ρ > 1/2 and k > r. The former condition implies that unfriendly leadership is less
costly to implement than friendly leadership, whereas the latter condition implies that
engaging in friendly leadership actions is socially inefficient because the leader’s costs
exceed the worker’s benefit.22 If ul > u implementing style U becomes more attractive
because WFl > W
U
l .
In case (ii), the worker earns a rent under style F , but not under style U . Relative to
case (i), style U becomes more attractive. Suppose for a moment that WFl = W
U
l . The
principal prefers style U if ρ > 1/2 and the worker’s rent under style F is sufficiently
large due to a high benefit ∆. Our assumption ul ≥ max{u,w + ρr − c + ∆̄} implies
22Note that, in the current setting, the principal may implement style F even if k > r because monetary
incentives are not available.
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that WFl > W
U




l ) is increasing in ∆, a higher benefit ∆
makes the principal implement style U for a greater region among the other parameters.
In case (iii), the benefit ∆ is so large that the worker earns a rent under either
style, which also implies that the worker’s wage is independent of the adopted style.
Again, suppose for a moment that WFl = W
U
l . Then, the principal chooses style U
whenever it entails lower leadership costs than style F , i.e., ρ > 1/2. Our assumption




l . Thus, ρ > 1/2 is sufficient for
the implementation of style U . If ρ ≤ 1/2, adoption of style U can still be optimal but is
optimal for a smaller region among the other parameters as ∆ increases. The reason is
that hiring an altruistic instead of a spiteful leader becomes less costly when the worker
earns a higher rent.
Overall, provided that ρ > 1/2, style U dominates style F for a larger region among
the other parameters the higher ∆. The worker’s rent is weakly increasing in ∆ under
either style, but the rent is higher under style F than under style U for intermediate
values of ∆. The existence of worker rents reduces or even eliminates the comparative
advantage that style F has over style U in terms of the expected wage that the principal
needs to pay to the worker, similar to the results obtained in the model discussed in the
main body of the paper.
Worker rents may also arise in a different kind of model where the employment
relationship generates a quasi-rent that principal and agent share according to their
relative bargaining powers. Quasi-rents can arise due to labor market frictions as studied
in, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). Consider a two-period model where the firm
trains the worker in the first period and the worker exerts effort to produce an output
in the second period as in our model above. In the first period, the worker may acquire
firm-specific human capital that makes him more productive with the current firm than
with other firms, leading to a quasi-rent. Alternatively, workers could have low or high
ability and the firm learns the worker’s ability in the first period, whereas other firms
on the labor market do not learn the worker’s ability. Again, a quasi-rent arises when
the worker stays with the firm in the second period. Similar to the above model, the
existence of quasi-rents that are shared between firm and worker may make the adoption
of unfriendly styles less costly for the principal.
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